



Record of Meeting, 4:30 P.M., August 3, 1961

Present: The President, the Secretary of State, Mr. Owen



2. The Secretary spoke of the possibility of an early instruction to Thompson to make a quiet approach to Khrushchev. One object would be to get Khrushchev engaged in a discussion of the access question. This object might better be achieved in private rather than in a formal talk.




SANITIZED

~~SECRET~~

BY nm NUK-84-114  
NARA DATE 12/85

~~SECRET~~

-2-



9. The Secretary said that while in Paris he would visit the NATO Council with the Attorney General. After Paris he would go to Italy to see Segni. He would write to the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers from Paris. The President thought well of the British suggestion that the Secretary come home by way of London.

10. The Secretary intended that Ambassadors Bruce, Dowling, Thompson, and Kennan constitute a standing group to provide ideas on Berlin. Kennan would also be keeping in touch with neutrals. The Belgrade meeting of neutral nations was briefly covered.

11. Tripartite consultation would take place in Washington. The Secretary would consult with the two Ambassadors; French and British members of the Standing Group would be brought in, as appropriate. This may not satisfy the French; they will have to be convinced that we meant what we said when we suggested that discretion would be needed.



~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

13. The President mentioned Senator Case's letter dealing with the possibility of a canal from Czechoslovakia.

14. It was agreed that the decision to propose a Four Power Foreign Ministers' meeting in early October should not be firmly taken in Paris, but should be referred to the Heads of Governments. The danger of leaks would thus be minimized.

[REDACTED]

16. The President mentioned the likely difficulty of persuading de Gaulle and Adenauer to our proposed positions at a Western Heads of Government meeting. The Secretary suggested that, in the end, de Gaulle would probably go along with our proposals, if the President indicated that they were essential to preserve our position in Berlin.

17. There was some discussion of propaganda themes. The President did not think much of the "defaulting trustee" theme. The Secretary said that our propaganda would be geared to the main themes in the President's speech, which was being widely translated and circulated.

18. The Secretary said that we should try now to keep Berlin out of the UN, where we would lack support as a result of Bizerte. We would have to take Berlin to the UN, however, if there were a peace treaty and moves were made against our access.

19. The discussion turned away from Berlin:

(a) The Secretary thought that negotiations over Bizerte would succeed if they could get started but that

neither side


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

neither side wanted to make the first move. He would probably see de Gaulle about this subject in Paris.

(b) Pereira (the number two man in Portugal) is coming here as Ambassador. We can probably deal with his government more effectively through him than we could have through the high level U.S. envoy who had been considered. The Secretary reported



(c) The President wondered whether he should send a letter to Chiang expressing satisfaction with the recent Washington talks and discussing the Outer Mongolian issue. The Secretary suggested that he wait until we could consult with the Afro-Asians; assurances of their support were needed before embarking on the intended course of action.

(d) The Secretary said that he would try to move the French to greater flexibility in their views about a disarmament forum.

(a) The Secretary suggested that the President go to the General Assembly early in the session, that the Secretary should stay on to 7 - 10 days to see all the Foreign Ministers, and that Ambassador Stevenson should be left to carry the general debate.

(f) The Secretary reported that Chairman Morgan would have two Congressional nominations for the General Assembly on Monday.

~~SECRET~~